Since the "open door" policies adopted by China in 1978 ended 30 years of isolation, introduced massive economic and legal reforms, encouraged foreign investment and resurrected private enterprise, China has become the world's second largest and fastest growing economy. In these circumstances, the development of franchising was inevitable. However, in addition to the normal commercial and cultural issues which challenge any franchise system in its international expansion, foreign franchisors proposing to enter China have faced additional regulatory obstacles. Market entry, participation in particular business sectors, and even the use of franchising as a method of business operation and expansion have all raised complex regulatory issues.
I.

INTRODUCTION
In the late 1940s when Dick and Mac McDonald, Harlin Sanders, Howard Johnson and other franchising pioneers were refining their concepts which would within a few years revolutionise the distribution of goods and services, China was preparing for quite a different revolution. The establishment of the People's Republic of China as a new communist country on 1 October 1949 was to have a profound effect not only on its citizens but also on global commerce. It was nevertheless another three decades before the "open door" policies 1 of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 ended three decades of isolation and re-engaged China with the outside world. These sweeping economic reforms created an environment in which franchising could be practised, as by then it had been in the West, to deliver substantial benefits to the business sector, consumers and the economy generally. The development of the franchising sector in China nevertheless required further stimulus. The franchising concept was not well understood locally. Foreign franchise systems were yet to enter the Chinese market and introduce the concept. A legal framework for foreign investment, and for the operation of franchised business in China, was yet to be established.
The development of the domestic franchise sector in China owes much to the pioneering US fast food systems. Their international expansion provided the lead for local development, as it has elsewhere around the world. It was the entry of KFC in 1987 and McDonald's in 1990 that provided the catalyst for the development of the franchise sector in China. It is therefore ironic that both KFC and McDonald's operate primarily in China not as traditional franchise systems, but as company-owned chains. Their standardised operations, albeit not franchised, nevertheless encouraged local entrepreneurs to embrace franchising as well as paving the way for the entry of other international franchise systems.
A well-established legal system, and underlying commercial laws to support business operations, are necessary to provide the legal framework for franchising development. However, in the context of China there are further considerations. China has had a restrictive and highly complex foreign investment regime, and participation in particular sectors -including the domestic consumer market -has been strictly controlled. In addition to an appropriate body of underlying commercial law (which may include franchise specific regulation), and machinery for dispute resolution and enforcement, market access liberalisation is also a necessary prerequisite for franchise sector development. 1 Unlike the situation in other countries, where franchising is a product of the commercial environment, in China, franchising is a product of the law. The market entry of prominent foreign franchise systems under the legal reforms which made foreign investment possible provided the catalyst for domestic franchise development. However, the adoption of franchising as a method of business expansion was frustrated by the law not recognising this dynamic business arrangement until 1997. The introduction of the Measures for the Administration of Commercial Franchises (Trial Implementation) (the Interim Franchise Measures) in 1997 by the then Ministry of Internal Trade which regulated domestic franchisors was the first official recognition of franchising as a distinct method of business operation. It was another decade before China finally introduced a unified regulatory regime for both domestic and foreign franchisors when in 2007 the State Council released the Regulation on the Administration of Commercial Franchises. Despite its short history -the term "franchise" ("te xu") as a method of business operation did not enter the Chinese language until the 1980s -the Chinese franchise sector has grown to over 1600 systems today 2 which makes it one of the world's most franchised countries in terms of number of systems.
This paper reviews the development of the legal regime for franchising, and of the laws relaxing the restrictions on foreign franchisors' entry and expansion, and analyses the impact of China's regulatory regime on foreign franchisors' choice of entry and expansion modes.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT FOR FRANCHISING IN CHINA
The decision by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 to open the Chinese economy after 30 years of isolation and to move from a command economy to a "socialist market economy" -or, in the words of one commentator, "to revive Chinese communism by injecting it with limited doses of capitalism" 3 -signalled the start of what has been described as "one of the greatest industrial revolutions in world history" 4 and "one of the most significant and positive global developments of the past 25 years". 5 The economic reforms following the adoption of the "open door" policy created the environment in which franchising was possible. Through allowing private enterprise and liberalising foreign investment, the platform was in place for the development of domestic and foreign franchising. World Trade Organisation (WTO) accession commitments and obligations 6 to open retail, services and franchising sectors to foreign competition, coupled with stronger intellectual property protection under the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights treaty, 7 have clearly had a significant influence on the development of franchising in an increasingly open and flexible economy.
A. Entry and Example of Foreign Franchise Systems
The development of domestic franchise sectors around the world owes much to the pioneering US fast food systems whose international expansion has provided the stimulus for local development. The lead was provided by state-owned enterprises but private enterprises quickly embraced the concept. 8 The international fast food pioneers' contribution to China far transcends their system products. What endures is not simply a new business but a new way of thinking about doing business which the entrepreneurial Chinese have embraced with enthusiasm. Ironically, KFC and McDonald's operate primarily in China not as traditional franchise systems but as company chains owned and operated with a joint venture partner. KFC has over 3200 outlets, 9 only a small percentage of which are currently franchised. 10 McDonald's has over 1500 outlets, only six of which were franchised by the end of 2010.
11 This operational mode has been 6 On 11 July 1986, China formally applied to resume its membership of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In November 2001, China was finally admitted to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (the successor to GATT), 51 years after withdrawing from the then international trade system. The Director General of the WTO at that time, Mike Moore, described China's WTO accession as "one of the most significant events of the 21 st century", The Australian, 24 September 2001. driven by a number of factors -the former restrictions on market entry without a joint venture partner, the lack of a regulatory regime to enforce franchise agreements and commercial considerations. The immature state of the underlying infrastructure in a developing country and a paucity of qualified franchisees have frustrated a franchising strategy as has the lack of understanding of the franchising concept and its unique dynamics. Despite the growing popularity of franchising in China, the legal and commercial intricacies of the relationship are not well understood by prospective franchisors and franchisees, and even by government officials. At this stage of China's development, there is only a small pool of potential franchisees able to meet KFC and McDonald's stringent selection criteria and, in any event, franchise fees of KFC and McDonald's are extremely high by Chinese standards. Prospective franchisees with the financial resources are reluctant to commit to the sustained training and hands-on management which are required by KFC and McDonald's. From the franchisor's perspective, there are residual concerns as to the commitment of prospective franchisees to honour the contract and conform to the system in its entirety.
B. Market Liberalisation
In addition to the normal legal, commercial and cultural issues which challenge any franchise system in international expansion, foreign franchisors proposing to enter China have faced additional regulatory obstacles. Market entry, participation in particular business sectors and even the use of franchising as a method of business operation and expansion, have all raised complex regulatory issues. The success of prominent international franchise brands in China is proof that the regulatory and bureaucratic challenges can be overcome. However, the operations of these companies in China have been primarily through a chain network of owned and managed outlets with a local joint venture partner rather than through conventional franchising. making business entry into formerly closed sectors including franchising much more viable and feasible.
Liberalisation of foreign direct investment
An integral element of China's "open door" policies was a legislative framework sufficient to attract international investment. Foreign investment in China has been allowed since 1979 through arrangements involving an equity joint venture, 13 since 1986 through a wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE) 14 and since 1988 through a contractual or cooperative joint venture 15 albeit with certain restrictions in particular commercial sectors. Nevertheless, given China's long period of isolation, it is not surprising that the stated priority of China's massive economic and legal reforms was to "assist China in reaching its goals of economic and technical modernisation rather than to assist foreigners in exploiting the Chinese domestic consumer markets". 16 The laws governing foreign investment have been revised at various times to liberalise the formerly restrictive requirements driven by the desire to attract further foreign investment.
Liberalisation of restrictions on foreign entry into retail, service and franchise sectors
The liberalisation of direct foreign investment did not by itself open the domestic franchise sector to foreign franchisors. Entry into specific industry sectors has been regulated by the Provisions on Guiding Foreign Investment Direction 17 which classifies foreign investment projects into four categories: "encouraged", "permitted", "restricted" and "prohibited" which are listed in the 27 Japan, in 1983 , and France, in 1989 , and Brazil, in 1994 , had adopted provisions impacting on franchising but they were minimalist regimes providing little guidance for best practice.
28 The Chinese-speaking jurisdictions, Singapore and Taiwan, did not have a franchise specific law at that time (Singapore still does not and relies on sector selfregulation to supplement commercial laws of general application). It is not surprising that Chinese officials looked to the US experience for guidance but equally unsurprising that they embraced little of it. 29 The complexities of the US regulation were beyond the understanding of officials for whom franchising was a new concept and also beyond China's need at the time which was for an ad hoc law to address a new commercial phenomenon in a rapidly developing country. franchising laws to supplement the underlying commercial law framework and no consensus as to best practice.
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Introduced at a time when the franchising concept was virtually unknown in China, the 1997 Interim Franchising Measures evidenced the beginning of understanding of the franchise concept by Chinese government officials and business entrepreneurs. As Ministry rules, they had limited legal effect and, in applying only to domestic franchisors, left the status of franchising by foreign invested franchisors uncertain. 32 In the context of a legal system in which activity which is not expressly authorised is, by implication, prohibited, the Interim Franchising Measures, despite being administrative rules of a general nature, had a significant role in the official recognition and, by implication, encouragement of franchising as a distinct method of business operation. 33 The object of the 1997 Interim Franchising Measures, as stated in article 2 was to "standardise franchise operations, protect the legal rights and interests of the parties and promote the growth of chain business". Given China's economic and social development at that time, the object of promoting franchising and education the general public and government officials were clearly the primary motivation. and applied to both domestic and foreign franchisors. FIE franchisors were nevertheless subject to an approval process which wholly domestic franchisors were not subject to -a runners carry out their commitment to franchise brand owners and should ensure the quality of the stores … ". The draft has been completed and will soon be submitted for review by the State Council. It is expected to be implemented before the end of this year after winning approval from the State Council. A consultation draft of the proposed new regulation was unofficially released to the CCFA and relevant committees for discussion as early as Franchise Measures and for subjecting foreign and domestic franchisors to the same law. Although the position of foreign franchisors is strengthened under the new unified regime some particular issues nevertheless remain unresolved including the status of direct cross-border franchising which is addressed below.
III. 2007 COMMERCIAL FRANCHISE REGULATION
The Franchise Regulation applies to "commercial franchising activities conducted within the territory of the People's Republic of China" (article 2) and is formulated with the aims of "regulating commercial franchising activities, promoting the healthy and orderly development of commercial franchising and safeguarding market order" (article 1). Although in terms of its regulatory content it is simply a refinement rather than a re-engineering of the previous regime it is particularly significant for two reasons. It subjects both foreign-invested and domestic Chinese franchisors to the same regulatory regime (through removal of the chapter in the 2005 Franchise Measures containing supplementary approval provisions applicable only to foreign-invested franchisors). And, because it is State Council Regulation, it is law of a higher status than the previous Ministry Measures which were essentially administrative rules of uncertain legal effect. Unfortunately, it fails to clarify the status of foreign franchisors seeking sector entry through master franchising rather than through a foreign-invested enterprise. The 2007 Franchise Regulation had, as noted above, a long heritage. Since the late 1990s there had been official recognition of the need for a new franchise regulation to address WTO accession commitments, to combat abuses inherent in a new and rapidly developing sector, and to impose a uniform regime for domestic and foreign franchisors at an authoritative level. The rapid growth of franchising in China was accompanied by problems that are familiar to all franchising sectors -that of the "scam-merchant" to use the colourful American 
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Asian Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 7 [2012] , Iss. 1, Art. 1 DOI: 10.2202 /1932 -0205.1357 expression as well as the under-prepared, inexperienced and ill-advised franchisors with little understanding of the subtleties and realities of the complex franchisor/franchisee relationship trading off the promise of franchising without the capacity or will to deliver on it. Much franchising in China is not in the full business format mode which has exacerbated the problem of bad practices in key areas such as brand integrity, training, support, supply and system standards.
Within days of the release of the Regulation, the official website of the Central People's Government of the PRC published Questions and Answers Regarding China's New Franchise Regulation presented by members of the State Council Legislative Affairs Office and the Ministry of Commerce. 40 The commentary notes that the Regulation was based on international experience tempered by China's circumstances and that it balanced freedom of contract with the need for administrative guidance for the healthy development of the sector. The challenges facing the Chinese franchise sector were frankly acknowledged -"market order is chaotic". 41 The commentary notes that the key to regulating franchising is to "normalise the franchisor's conduct":
The Regulation has mainly stipulated some necessary rules, measures and requirements that are basic to the normalisation and administration of franchising standards and activities, and some explicit legal liabilities to ensure the implementation of these standards. The regulation has only emphasised the essential elements of the standards and left the parties to resolve other issues through contractual agreement as part of their legal relationship. At the same time the Regulation stipulated measures and requirements primarily to regulate the conduct of franchisors. 42 The 30 countries which do not rely exclusively on underlying business laws of general application to regulate their franchise sectors, and which have introduced franchise-specific regulation, rely on one or more regulatory strategies: prior disclosure, standards of conduct and registration. 43 In common with the majority of the regulated regimes China relies primarily on a comprehensive franchisor prior disclosure strategy. The case for legislation mandating prior disclosure to address the information imbalance inherent in the typical franchising Ibid.
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Ibid. 44 Despite the generality of several of the disclosure obligations -a characteristic inherent in Chinese legal drafting more generally 45 -the prior disclosure provisions broadly conform to the UNIDROIT model and hold few surprises for those familiar with leading western models such as those of the US, Canada and Australia. Unlike the UNIDROIT model which is exclusively a prior disclosure model, the 2007 Franchise Regulation also addresses conduct and registration although at a more minimalist level than other jurisdictions utilising these regulatory strategies. In relation to conduct the Franchise Regulation imposes a general duty of good faith which is supplemented by very few specific conduct obligations in comparison to a jurisdiction such as Australia which regulates a variety of conduct issues including termination and transfer. 46 The parties' obligations are generally left to the franchise agreement reflecting freedom of contract principles. In relation to registration, China, unlike the majority of the regulated regimes, requires franchisor registration albeit on a "light touch" model in the nature of archival recording rather than a comprehensive "audit" and registration model. The 2007 Franchise Regulation is nevertheless unique in requiring, as a prerequisite to registration, a mature business model, the ability to provide long term guidance and the operation of at least two outlets of the system for at least a year. This Chinese model, adopted to give some comfort that the system is viable, was later adopted by Vietnam.
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The 2007 Franchising Regulation comprises five chapters. Chapter 1, General Provisions, states the aim of the Regulation, defines "franchise", sets out a principle of good faith, and outlines the administrative arrangements for the supervision of franchising. Chapter 2, Franchising Activities, prescribes the qualifications for a franchisor and the registration/filing process, specifies terms of franchise contracts and addresses other relationship obligations. Chapter 3, Information Disclosure, sets up a prior disclosure regime and specifies 12 categories of information which franchisors must provide 30 days before signing the agreement. Chapter 4, Legal Liabilities, provides for administrative sanctions which may be imposed on franchisors who violate the Regulation, and includes a provision governing officials of the relevant commercial department While criticisms may be made of particular aspects of China's 2007 Franchise Regulation there is no criticism of the concept of regulation itself. While in some, and even perhaps most, national franchise sectors regulation may be regarded as an unwelcome, albeit increasingly common, intrusion into the free enterprise system, in China the introduction of a franchise law was a significant and necessary step. Philip Zeidman has commented that "in the final analysis, it may well be that the sheer act of regulation -and, in the process, the recognition of franchising, the stripping away of its 'second class' status -is more important than the contents themselves". 50 The President of McDonald's Chinese operations stated in 2002 that "McDonald's will begin franchising only after relevant regulations and laws are defined in China".
51 That McDonald's in China is still primarily a company-owned and managed network suggests that franchise specific regulation is a necessary, but not an exclusive, prerequisite to franchising. Social, commercial and cultural factors are highly influential. 
A. Definition
A franchise is conventionally defined as "an arrangement whereby an enterprise (hereafter referred to as a 'franchisor') through an agreement grants other operators (hereafter referred to as the 'franchisees') the right to use its business operating resources, including registered trademarks, logos, patents and proprietary technologies; whereby the franchisee conducts business under a uniform mode of operation; and whereby the franchisee pays franchise fees according to the agreement" (article 3). Although this definition is broadly consistent with international practice, the generality of the drafting nevertheless has led to uncertainty in interpretation and application, and to some enterprises in China claiming they are not franchising but licensing in order to avoid complying with the requirements of the Regulation. 53 Unlike the 1997 and 2005 Measures, the 2007 Regulation does not expressly mention master or regional franchising by a franchisor (described in the 1997 Interim Franchise Measures as the franchisor granting to a franchisee the right in a given region to grant franchises or itself set up and conduct a franchise network within the region).
B. Qualifications
Uncertainty exists in relation to the provision that "no entities or individuals other than an enterprise may engage in franchising activities as a franchisor" (article 3). It is nevertheless sensible to interpret this requirement as limiting franchisors to registered businesses including sole traders, companies and contractual joint ventures, thus excluding schools, government departments and even military divisions which in the past have engaged in business. Qualifications for franchisors, but not franchisees, are specified. Franchisor:
• shall have a mature business model and be capable of continuously providing operational guidance, technical support, business training, and other services to the franchisee; • shall own at least two directly operated company owned outlets for more than one year (article 7). The later requirement, generally referred to as the "2+1" rule, is imposed, presumably, to ensure that only proven concepts are franchised. The danger is that it may provide a misleading impression of commercial viability. Two outlets in a foreign country, or two outlets in a distant city in China, provide little comfort that the concept can be successfully franchised in a particular location. The "2+1" requirement in the 2007 Franchise Regulation has two differences from the "2+1" requirement in the 2005 Franchise Measures which required the franchisor to have "at least two direct sale stores (or stores owned by its subsidiary or holding company) in operations for more than one year within China". The Franchise Regulation is silent on whether the outlets need to be "within China" and on whether they can be operated by the franchisor's affiliates. On a literal interpretation the requirement of store operation in China is relaxed so that overseas operations qualify. However, a literal interpretation also suggests that the outlets cannot be operated by affiliates which is not an uncommon practice. While the Franchise Recording Measures (article 5) clarify that overseas outlets satisfy the "2+1" requirement, they do not clarify the issue of operation by affiliates. The Ministry of Commerce has recently proposed an amendment to the Franchise Recording Measures to clarify that stores of a franchisor's affiliates satisfy the 2+1 requirement. which held that contravention of the "2+1" requirement did not invalidate the contract and thus give rise to the remedy of recession but simply subjected the franchisor to administrative penalties. Although, under China's civil law system, the courts are not bound by precedents, the question of whether the "2+1" requirement is only an administrative provision (the breach of which will lead to imposition of administrative penalties (fines) but which will not invalidate the contract) or whether it is a substantive requirement (which, if not met, invalidates the franchise agreement), would have seem to have been resolved in favour of the former. A third interpretation has been proposed -that the first part of article 7, which requires a mature business model, is mandatory, but that the second paragraph containing the "2+1" requirement is merely an administrative guide 59 -but the judicially considered.
C. Registration
The 2007 Franchise Regulation removes the approval requirement for foreign franchisors contained in the 2005 Franchise Measures, and subjects both domestic and foreign franchisors to a mandatory "filing" requirement. 60 The Chinese word used, "bei an", may be translated as "registration" or "filing" or "recording" and different terms are used in various translations. 61 In fact, little turns on the 62 to the provincial level department of commerce (if business activity is conducted only within one province), or to the Ministry of Commerce (in cross-provincial franchising) for archival filing within 15 days after the sale of its first franchise and the submission of an annual report to relevant commercial departments (article 19).
63 Within 10 days of receiving these documents the relevant commerce department will notify the franchisor (article 9) and post details on the list of registered franchisors on the government website (article 10).
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The 2007 Recording Measures introduced electronic registration/filing through online submission. They also impose an annual updating obligation on the franchisor (article 7), and require the franchisor to update changes in relation to the information listed in the 12 catalogues in the Recording Measures within 30 days. Concerns have been expressed that the compliance cost imposed by the Measures may slow the development of the growing franchise sector. 65 On the other hand the move to a registration requirement is less burdensome than the previous approval system and, for this reason, has generally been welcomed by foreign franchisors. 66 Ironically, the burdens of compliance fall more heavily on domestic franchisors, particularly those smaller enterprises in remote areas, than on foreign franchisors.
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If the products or services of the franchise system are required by law to have other authorisations before they can be sold or provided, the franchisor shall also submit such authorisations or certificates (article 8).
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Documentation to be submitted includes: a copy of the business licence or a copy of the enterprise registration certificate; the standard form of franchise agreement; the franchise operating manual; the marketing plan; a written undertaking that the franchisor complies with the requirements for franchisors as set out in article 7 and other relevant evidence of compliance; and other documents and materials prescribed by the commercial administrative department of the State Council.
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If the submitted documents and materials are incomplete, the relevant commerce department may grant the franchisor an additional seven days to submit supplementary documents and materials (article 9). A proposed amendment to the Measures removes the 10 days requirement on the authority to complete the filing. Supra note 55.
D. Disclosure
The items of prior disclosure by the franchisor required by the 2007 Franchise Regulation are based on the previous Franchise Measures with some modifications. However the Regulation introduces a more comprehensive disclosure regime with prior disclosure made in accordance with the Information Disclosure Measures decreed by the Ministry of Commerce and adds a requirement of ongoing disclosure by a franchisor of material changes after the initial disclosure (article 23). The Franchise Regulation provides for information to be provided under the following headings (article 22):
• the franchisor's name, place of business, legal representative, registered capital, the scope of its franchise business and basic information about its franchise activities; • basic information about the franchisor's registered trademarks, business logos, patents, proprietary technology and operational or business format model; • the type, amount and method of payment for franchise fees, (including whether security deposits are required and the conditions and method of refunding a security deposit); • the costs and the terms and conditions for the products, services and equipment provided by the franchisor; • detailed content, delivery methods and implementation plan regarding the continuous services to be provided to the franchisee, including operating guidance, technical support, training and other services; • detailed method of guidance and supervision regarding the franchisees' operations; • the investment budget for a franchise location;
• the number and location of existing franchise outlets within the territory of China, their distribution by region, and an assessment of their business performance; • summaries of the financial statements and audit reports, audited by an accounting firm, for the most recent two years; • franchise-related lawsuits and arbitrated matters for the last five years and their status; • whether the franchisor or its management legal representative have been convicted of serious illegal operations; • other information specified by the Commerce Department of the State Council.
The Information Disclosure Measures prescribe further details to be included under these headings. 67 The prescribed information, and a model franchise agreement, must be provided to the franchisee at least 30 days before the agreement is executed (article 21). 68 All information provided shall be true, accurate and complete and shall not conceal any relevant information, or provide any false information and "significant changes" in the information provided must be promptly given to the franchisee (article 23).
E. Franchise Agreement
The 2007 Franchise Regulation closely resembles the previous Measures in requiring a written franchise agreement containing provisions relating to:
• the franchisor's and the franchisee's basic information;
• franchising provisions and the term of the agreement;
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• the types of franchise fees, the amounts to be paid and the method of payment;
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• specific provisions regarding the standards of operation for the franchised business, the technical support to be provided by the franchisor and the training services to be provided and how these will be delivered; • the standards for the quality of the products or services and quality guarantees, and how these will be monitored and maintained;
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• how the promotion and advertising of the products or services will be conducted; • provisions regarding the protection of consumer rights and interests by the franchisee and franchisor and allocation of responsibilities and liabilities for compensation; cover a franchisor's "affiliates", a concept which is widely defined. The proposed amendment also, inter alia, requires more detailed disclosure in relation to the services to be provided by the franchisor. See online: <http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/as/201104/20110407522422.html?2341983954=52123593 7> (accessed 23 October 2011).
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The "contract" to be submitted for filing under article 8 is a model contract. Article 21 in relation to provision of the contract to the franchisee uses a different Chinese word and has led to uncertainty as to whether the actual contract to be signed or a model contract must be submitted. The Information Disclosure Measures clarity that it is a "model contract" which must be provided to the franchisee.
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Article 13 provides that the stipulated franchise term shall be not less than three years "unless it is otherwise agreed upon by the franchisee". This provision is not applicable on a renewal.
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If a franchisor requires a franchisee to pay any fees before the parties enter into the franchise agreement, the franchisor shall specify in writing the purpose of such fees, under what circumstances will the money be refunded, and how to obtain a refund (article 16).
71
The standard of the products and services supplied by the franchise system shall be in accordance with the law, the relevant administrative rules and regulations and other related governmental requirements (article 15).
• provisions regarding amendment, cancellation and termination of the franchise agreement; • default provisions and liability;
• dispute settlement mechanisms;
• other provisions which the franchisor and franchisee have agreed upon.
The imperfect drafting and ambiguity which characterise much legal drafting in China is graphically illustrated by article 13 which states that "[t]he franchise agreement shall have a minimum term of three years. But it may be shorter if the franchisee agrees". The purpose and legal effect of this provision are unclear. The Regulation requires the franchise agreement to contain a "cooling-off" period under which a franchisee may unilaterally terminate the contract "within a certain time after the franchise contract has been signed" (article 12).
F. Relationship and Conduct
The 2007 Franchise Regulation incorporates the mantra from the previous Measures that "persons engaged in franchising must follow the principles of voluntariness, fairness, honesty, and good faith" (article 4). The Regulation nevertheless departs from the model of the previous Measures which, in separate articles, lists basic rights and obligations of both franchisors and franchisees. Certain specific and prosaic relationship issues are nevertheless addressed. The franchisor is required to provide a franchise operations manual to the franchisee, and provide continuing operational guidance, technical support, business training and other services to the franchisee in accordance with the franchise agreement (article 14). The Franchise Regulation also departs from the 2005 Franchise Measures in removing the onerous and much criticised provision making the franchise jointly and severally liable for the quality of designated suppliers' products and services.
Fees for promotion and marketing of the franchise system must be applied in accordance with the terms of the franchise agreement, and promotional and marketing expenses shall be promptly disclosed to franchisees (article 17). A franchisee does not have the right to transfer the franchise to a third person without the consent of the franchisor (article 18). This provision regrettably does not provide the usual qualification that the franchisor cannot unreasonably withhold consent.
72 A franchisee is prohibited from revealing or permitting other persons to access the franchisor's "commercial secrets" (article 18). 
G. Advertising
Heavy penalties may be imposed on franchisors who engage in fraudulent or misleading conduct in promotional activity or who make claims as to franchisee revenue in advertising (article 17).
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H. Administration
The Ministry of Commerce is responsible for the supervision and administration of franchising activities nationally. The commercial departments of the governments of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities administer franchising activities in their respective territories (article 5). Employees of commercial departments who abuse their power may be criminally or administratively liable (article 30). The role of industry associations, such as the China Chain Store and Franchise Association, is also officially recognised in the Franchise Regulation. Guided by the Ministry of Commerce, they may establish franchising codes of conduct to strengthen self-regulation, and provide relevant services to franchisors and franchisees (article 32).
IV. THE FOREIGN FRANCHISOR AND THE CURRENT REGULATORY REGIME
The 2007 Franchise Regulation provides a solid foundation for future franchising development through its status as a regulation of the State Council and its unified regime for domestic and foreign franchisors. Foreign franchisors have welcomed the removal of requirement in the previous Measures which made franchisors jointly and severally liable for the products and services provided by their designated suppliers and the adoption of a registration requirement in the nature of "filing" rather than "approval". Comfort will also be taken from the express recognition of the freedom of contract (article 4) and the protection of the trade secrets of the franchisor (article 18). Given its very long gestation period, the 2007 Franchise Regulation is perhaps an anti-climax. This indeed may be one of its strengths. It contains no real surprises and is a refinement rather than a reengineering of the previous regime. The broadness and generality of many of the provisions of the 2007 Franchise Regulation will remain a source of concern and frustration to franchisors, particularly foreign franchisors familiar with a more detailed regulatory scheme as is usual in common law jurisdictions, as will the 73 The franchisor may also be liable to penalties for misleading behaviour or misleading conduct under the Advertising Law (article 27). The Advertising Law of the People's Republic of China was passed at the 10 th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress on 27 October 1994 with effect on 1 February 1995.
influence of local levels of government bureaucracy and possibly inconsistent interpretations in applying the law. These issues are nevertheless to some extent inherent in the Chinese legal system.
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Running parallel to the evolution of the regulatory regime for the operation of franchised business in China from the 1997 Interim Measures to the 2007 Franchise Regulation have been two closely-related developments of great significance to foreign franchisors -the liberalisation of market entry for foreign franchisors and the unification of the regulatory regime for domestic and foreign franchisors. Both developments have been driven by WTO accession commitments and have made foreign franchising in China both legal and practicably possible.
There are nevertheless three particular issues in relation to which an undesirable degree of uncertainty remains -jurisdictional issues, operation and implications of the "2+1" requirement and the legal status of direct franchising into China by way of master franchising and area development arrangements. These are discussed below.
A. Jurisdiction
The 2007 Franchise Regulation applies to "commercial franchising activities conducted within the territory of the People's Republic of China" (article 1). The concept of "conducted within" China is not defined and some uncertainty arises as to the particular activities that will bring franchising within the jurisdictional net. Franchising activities conducted within China can be interpreted as applying to contracts negotiated and signed in China, or to franchised stores located in China. The problem arises when one party is not a Chinese enterprise and the direct or master franchise contract is signed outside China: when a Chinese franchisor contracts with a non-Chinese franchisee for stores located outside China; when a non-Chinese franchisor contracts with a Chinese franchisee outside China for stores located inside China; and when a Chinese franchisor contracts with a Chinese franchisee for stores outside China. 75 The position of master franchising - Law, Vol. 7 [2012 ], Iss. 1, Art. 1 DOI: 10.2202 /1932 -0205.1357 where a foreign franchisor grants franchising rights within China to a domestic master franchisee -is also uncertain and is addressed below.
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B. The "2+1" Requirement
The most widely-criticised aspect of the 2005 Franchise Measures from a foreign franchisor's perspective other than the special approvals provision was the requirement that prior to franchising a franchisor must have operated two directowned stores for at least one year in China (article 7.4). This "2+1" requirement created an obstacle for experienced foreign franchisors seeking to expand in China. The "2+1" requirement would not only slow down the expansion of foreign franchisors, but could also compel a franchisor to have company-owned stores which may not be the common strategy of that company. 77 The relaxation of the "2+1" requirement in the 2007 Franchise Regulation which omits any reference to the outlets being in China has been welcomed. 85 to foreign companies, enterprises and other economic organisations and individuals engaging in these activities through a foreign investment enterprise in China. Such operations must be through a "commercial enterprise with foreign investment" (a commercial FIE) -either a Sino-foreign equity or cooperative joint venture or, from 11 December 2004, a wholly foreign-owned enterprise (articles 1-3, 21). 86 No other structure for foreign investment in the retailing and franchise sectors is permitted (articles 19, 24 The Commercial FIE Measures also liberalise, in the same manner, commission agency services and wholesale operations.
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The restriction on a foreign company engaging in franchising activity before the time indicated was the key to the decision in Han Mei Yan v. Beijing Yinqi Bayi Yinqi Jianmei Limited, as discussed supra note 82.
"authorise others to establish outlets by franchising" (article 9) and in the latter case must comply with any separate state regulation on franchising 87 (article 19). As a result of the 2004 Commercial FIE Measures, participation in the franchise sector through a joint venture or WFOE is officially sanctioned. The structure adopted can be determined having regard to commercial considerations; in particular balancing the advantage of having a local partner without whom business operation in China is extremely difficult with the disadvantage of complex negotiations with a potential business partner and concerns about the possible loss of control in a venture with such a party. The franchisor entering China through a foreign invested vehicle has to choose between the advantage of having a local partner who does not necessarily understand western business and franchising norms in the case of a joint venture; or the disadvantage of no local partner but the corresponding advantage of control in the case of WFOE. The regulatory impediments are nevertheless removed and the bureaucratic requirements reduced. Regulation to deal with it is unfortunate. It will be unfortunate if foreign franchisors without a physical presence in China have to continue to use a nonfranchise "hybrid" model -"multiple contracts separately covering individual core essential elements of franchising, such as trade mark use licensing, backed by distribution contracts with quality control requirements" 88 -which may be open to legal challenge because of uncertainty as to the status of cross-border franchising.
D. Market Entry without a Foreign
A foreign franchisor can of course grant sub-franchising rights to a joint venture or WFOE satisfying the FIE laws but master franchising to a wholly domestic Chinese enterprise is not covered, and may indeed be prohibited if, by granting a master or area development franchise in China, a foreign franchisor is engaging in franchise operations within China. If a master franchise agreement has, as is invariably the case, provisions relating to image and standards, operating systems, product quality control, location control, trademark use, opening assistance, in-country training and support, particularly if enforced by site inspections, it can be argued that the foreign franchisor is engaging in franchise operations in China which, if not through a commercial The FIE Measures which first recognised the legality of franchising a foreign Franchise Model in the PRC, stipulated that foreign franchising activities … are to be conducted by a commercial FIE. Consistent with this approach the Measures, in turn, only speak of FIEs in relation to foreign franchising. The logical conclusion is therefore that a franchisor established under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction is not permitted to franchise directly its Franchise Model from its offshore jurisdiction to a PRC domestic franchisee. Instead it must be a direct foreign investor in the PRC in order to pursue franchising within the jurisdiction through its FIE.
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Concern as to the legality of direct offshore franchising into China has been expressed by scholars and practitioners. 91 Lavender nevertheless acknowledges that it would seem unlikely for the Ministry of Commerce to resort to wholesale invalidation of existing offshore franchising arrangements, considering the radical disruption of major prosperous large-scale business operations which this would represent.
92 Indeed, China's WTO accession commitments in relation to franchising specifically acknowledge cross-border franchising which may influence a more liberal stance to cross-border franchising by the authorities. Some comfort may be taken from the central government's pragmatic approach illustrated by its recognition that there were foreign invested enterprises who had expanded their businesses through franchising without the required approval prior to the introduction of the 2004 Commercial FIE Measures. The 2005 Franchise Measures provide that foreign franchisors already engaging in franchising could continue franchising by filing with the original approval authority (article 36). Non-compliant franchising was retrospectively authorised.
Frequently in China commercial expediency provides a solution to regulatory uncertainty. Prior to the development of the current regulatory framework under the 2007 Commercial Franchise Regulation foreign franchisors have frequently entered China through a non-franchise model comprising "the sum of most of the parts … instead of the synthetic whole". 93 Lavender describes these as "multiple contracts separately covering individual core essential elements of franchising, such as trademark use licensing, backed by distribution contracts 90 Susan Lavender, supra note 88. Lavender, supra note 88, also opines on how the offshore foreign franchisor could be penalised for non-compliance with the Measures: "Being offshore it is outside the jurisdiction of the PRC. It is a foreign ghost rather than a domestic legal entity that can be called to answer for non-conformity with legal requirements. The penalties imposed by the Measures are only applicable to PRC-based entities, being fines (and only a maximum of RMB 30,000) or revocation of business licence. Royalty payments flowing from the PRC franchisee to the offshore franchisor would appear to be the only tangible aspect of the franchising arrangements that could be controlled". with quality control requirements [which] omit reference to the synthesised concept of licensing of an operating model as a whole, since this element most conclusively categorises the contractual arrangements as franchising rather than various anomalous forms of licensing combined with distribution".
94 Such structures replicate the advantages of the franchise model through a series of agreements covering the various elements. If the legal uncertainty as to the validity of master franchising continues, the "non-franchise" model may continue to be used. The legality of the non-franchise model is nevertheless a concern and as it leaves open the possibility of being judicially or administratively determined to amount in fact to franchising as defined.
The 2004 Commercial FIE Measures constitute the main case against the legitimacy of cross-border franchising but, as Ministry Measures, are subordinate to the State Council 2007 Regulation on Commercial Franchises which applies to all "commercial franchising operations conducted within the boundaries" of China and suggest no distinction between direct investment and cross-border franchising. China's WTO accession commitments include, in relation to franchising, 95 the removal of restrictions on geographical location, number, equity ratio and form of establishments for foreign investment by no later than 11 December 2004 96 and the commitment to impose no limitations as market access in relation to crossborder supply. Support for the legitimacy of cross-border franchising is provided by China's WTO accession commitments.
Consistent with this interpretation, the Ministry of Commerce has indicated informally that cross-border franchising is permitted 97 but foreign franchisors would derive comfort from legislative classification or authoritative pronouncement. China's WTO commitments clearly indicate that direct franchising is permitted. However, given the significance of master franchisinginternationally the most common method of international expansion -the failure of the 2007 Franchise Regulation to expressly allow master franchising/area development is unfortunate.
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See WTO Working Party Report on the Accession of China, supra note 19.
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The liberalisation of restrictions involving geographical location, number, equity ratio and form of establishments for foreign investment has given effect to the 2004 Commercial FIE Measures.
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